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ABSTRACT. Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek
to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive
alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be
able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment
through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor
Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty
View as it stands cannot find any moral distinction between the permissible
punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in
extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive
appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights (or
claims) forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture
and rights infringement (or claims forfeiture and infringement) is the best solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our traditional theories of punishment – those based on utilitari-
anism and retribution – have implications which are counter-intu-
itive for many. Retributivism (in its purest forms) requires us to see
an offender’s suffering as good, appropriate, or warranted in and of
itself. Utilitarian theories avoid this entailment – punishment is, in
Jeremy Bentham’s words, ‘an evil, though necessary to prevent
greater evils’1 – but they have a hard time explaining what is wrong
with punishing the innocent. If punishment is at best a necessary
evil, then provided punishing the innocent does enough good, there
are no resources within utilitarianism to object to that, or to dis-
tinguish between the punishment of the innocent and the guilty.
1 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Second Edition (London: Trübner & Co., 1871), p. 360.
Law and Philosophy  The Author(s). This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com 2017
DOI 10.1007/s10982-017-9288-2
For those who find both entailments problematic, one way to try
to get around them is to combine the most attractive features of
these two traditional theories – namely, utilitarianism’s view of
punishment as a regrettable necessity, and retributivism’s link be-
tween guilt and punishment. This produces a group of theories
which I call ‘constrained instrumentalist’ theories. These theories
side with Bentham in seeing punishment as justified instrumentally,
by its extrinsic good effects, whilst agreeing with retributivism that
punishment is (ordinarily) only justified when applied to the guilty.
In order to avoid retributivist conclusions about the value or
appropriateness of suffering in and of itself, constrained instrumen-
talists must provide us with a concept other than desert which will
explain why we may only (ordinarily) use guilty persons’ punish-
ment in order to produce the extrinsic benefits that punishment is
thought to produce.
One variant of constrained instrumentalism limits instrumental
punishment by justifying it through the concept of duty. Instru-
mentalism requires us to use offenders’ suffering as a means to
achieving good effects. Many philosophers believe that using others
as a means in this way is ordinarily wrong. Duty-based views say that
we can permissibly use people’s suffering in this way when the
suffering we cause through punishment is suffering that the person
has an enforceable duty to experience. This is an attractive route for
two reasons. First, punishment is hard to justify. It involves doing
things to persons that it would ordinarily be impermissible to inflict
upon them. If people have an enforceable duty to do, or to experi-
ence, something, that would explain why these things may be done
to them. This is a general point about moral theory – we can jus-
tifiably harm people in the pursuit of some end when they have an
enforceable duty to take on that level of harm in the name of that
end. Think of cases where a culpable wrongdoer has created a threat
– we may harm him to avert that threat if, as seems plausible, he has
an enforceable duty to take on that level of harm in order to avert
the threat. Second, a more particular point about punishment itself:
It is an intuitive thought that offenders owe a ‘debt’ to their victims
or to society. Although the language of ‘debt’ is often employed by
retributivists, they owe an explanation of how punishment alone
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pays a ‘debt’.2 Instrumentalists, however, can show how the extrinsic
benefits of punishments that they demand as part of the justification
of punishment can make the repayment of debt through punishment
something real, rather than a mere metaphor. It seems plausible that
offenders have debts and thus duties to their victims and, perhaps, to
wider society, and punishment may be a way for them to discharge
those duties, for example by reducing crime through deterrence. We
can back up the idea that offenders have such duties with this
thought: If criminals who avoid punishment, for example by
escaping from prison (without harming anyone), do something
wrong, that must be not only because the community has a right to
punish them, but also because the offenders have a duty to submit to
punishment.
In this essay, I will argue that despite its attractiveness, this variant
of constrained instrumentalism has a serious problem. This problem
comes to light not when we think about the central case of punishing
offenders, but when we think about some ways in which punish-
ments – or harms very like punishments – may be inflicted on the
innocent. I will argue for the following claims. First, justifying
punishment through duty will sometimes, in extreme circumstances,
allow the punishment of the innocent. I take this to be a clarificatory
and sympathetic claim. Second, and more importantly, justifying
punishment through duty fails to differentiate between the permis-
sible punishment of the guilty and some permissible punishment of
the innocent, which is counter-intuitive. Third, another constraining
concept – namely, rights forfeiture (or claims forfeiture) – can do a
better job, when coupled with the notion of rights infringement (or
claims infringement). Finally, I examine whether rights forfeiture and
duty theories may be combined. That is, while I am sympathetic to
using duty to justify punishment, I think that rights forfeiture (or
claims forfeiture) must play a central role in the theory, if we are to
properly distinguish between the punishment of the innocent and
the punishment of the guilty. Endorsing this combination requires us
to accept some controversial positions on the relationship between
rights (or claims) and duties.
2 As Warren Quinn observes: ‘In punishment . . . there is a ‘‘taking away’’ from the criminal
without any obvious transfer of what is taken away to anyone else.’ Warren Quinn, ‘The Right to
Threaten and the Right to Punish’ in Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 327–373, at p. 334, n. 11.
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What I have to say applies to any theory of punishment which is
both instrumentalist and uses the concept of duty to justify instru-
mental punishment.3 However, in this essay I will focus on the
theory which most clearly and directly appeals to duty as its central
justifying concept – Victor Tadros’ ‘Duty View’.4 What it has to say
about the innocent is important ground on which to confront this
theory: Tadros is explicit that his theory’s protection for the innocent
is its main advantage over non-constrained instrumentalist theories
of punishment.5 As such, the problems I expose in the theory are
problems by the theory’s own guiding lights.
II. PUNISHING THE INNOCENT: CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE ISSUES
Most of us have the conviction that punishing the innocent is, to use
a vague phrase, morally troubling. However troubling we find the
idea of punishment generally (and we should find it at least prima
facie troubling6 – even if it can be justified, it involves the state
intentionally harming its own citizens), the idea that someone who
hasn’t broken any law, nor done anything morally wrong, ends up
being punished (or having an experience identical to punishment) is
even more troubling, and even harder to justify. Even if and when
3 An important theory that is related is the self-defence-based view, proposed by Daniel M. Farrell
and Phillip Montague. These views do not appeal first and foremost to duty, but rather to the right of
Victim to punish/defend herself in situations in which either Victim or Aggressor must be harmed.
However, should Victim choose to harm Aggressor, Aggressor surely has a duty to accept that harm
(and would not, for example, have any right of self-defence against the harm). Therefore, self-defence
views which appeal to duty and which recognize duties of rescue potentially have similar problems.
They can (as I suggest later) appeal to rights forfeiture and rights infringement to differentiate the cases.
Farrell points to rights forfeiture as an important concept. See Daniel M. Farrell, ‘The Justification of
General Deterrence’ in Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 367–394; Phillip Montague, ‘Punishment and
Societal Defense’ in Criminal Justice Ethics 2 (1983): 30–36.
4 The central statement of this theory is in Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: the moral foundations of
the criminal law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Hereafter, all parenthetical page references are
to The Ends of Harm. Tadros’ theory has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, but none of the
respondents has thus far noticed the problems I expose here. See the symposia (and Tadros’ responses)
in Law and Philosophy 32(1–3) (2013), Criminal Law and Philosophy 9(1) (2015), and Jerusalem Review of
Legal Studies 5 (2012).
5 On p. 42, Tadros states that: ‘The aim [of the book] is develop an instrumentalist account of
punishment that can meet the objections that retributivists have raised to consequentialist theo-
ries . . . It shares with retributivism the idea that respect for individuals, rather than the fact that it
would be futile or counterproductive, requires us not to punish the innocent or to punish the guilty
disproportionately.’ In fact, as we shall see, Tadros denies that retributivism itself necessarily respects this
shared idea.
6 Sometimes ‘prima facie’ is used as a synonym for ‘pro tanto’. I do not mean it in that sense here. I
mean to say that we have cause for thinking punishment troubling, on the face of it. It may be that
(justified) punishment is in no way troubling, which would not be the case if it were pro tanto troubling
(for then its troublingness might be outweighed, but would not be extinguished).
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punishing the innocent is permissible, there is a fundamental moral
distinction between punishing the innocent and punishing the
(legally and/or morally) guilty.
It is worth emphasizing four different ways in which an innocent
person may be ‘punished’. The first is the way that is most familiar to
us in the real world: We try very hard to establish the facts of the
case, but come to a mistaken conclusion. Call this accidental pun-
ishment. Any actual system of criminal law, no matter how well
designed and implemented, will have some accidental punishment.
The second is the kind that will be familiar from objections to
consequentialist theories: where some person or group of persons
subject someone they know to be innocent to punishment, or an
experience that is, in all relevant respects, identical to punishment,
because doing so will achieve some good effects. Some claim that it
is a conceptual impossibility to punish innocent persons in this way.7
It is claimed that this cannot be punishment since those who do the
‘punishing’ do not intend the suffering of the person to be an honest
punitive response to past wrongdoing. H.L.A. Hart’s famous defi-
nition of punishment requires it to be distributed to ‘an actual or
supposed offender for his offence’,8 and this form of imposed harm
does not fit this definition. Hart claims we should still call this
punishment – albeit punishment of a ‘secondary’ kind. Rawls calls
this ‘telishment’.9 I will not try to settle these conceptual issues here,
but I will use the term telishment to refer to this particular kind of
‘punishment’ of the innocent. Like Tadros,10 as far as I am con-
cerned, however we settle the conceptual issue, the normative issues
remain the same: Under what conditions (if any) can telishment be
justified? And how should we think of justified telishment compared
with justified punishment? Tadros takes his theory to show that
telishment is unjustified. I will show that in fact it justifies it in some
circumstances. And I will show that, like consequentialist theories,
7 I am grateful to Doug Husak and Alec Walen for encouraging me to address this.
8 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
p. 5. My emphasis.
9 John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ in his Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman ed. (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 27.
10 On p. 313 n.1, Tadros references the concept of telishment. Tadros is indifferent as to whether we
call this punishment of the innocent or telishment, since, for him, the normative issues remain the
same, whichever we call it.
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Tadros’ theory, as it is presented, cannot distinguish between justi-
fied telishment and justified punishment.
The third way to punish an innocent person is what we can call
framing: where some person or group of persons knows the
defendant to be innocent, but makes it look like they are not, such
that those who end up convicting and punishing them believe the
defendant to be guilty of wrongdoing. Therefore, those punishing
act and think in exactly the ways that they do under accidental
punishment, and the experience is identical for the person on the
receiving end. Some may want to deny that this is really punishment
as well, and call it a form of telishment. But it is hard to see why.
Since those who punish do so in response to perceived wrongdoing,
they punish a supposed offender for his supposed offence. While some
others (including the defendant) know of his innocence, that will
often be the case in accidental punishment as well, and nobody
wants to deny that that is punishment.
The final form of punishing the innocent comes about when we
are indifferent, or insufficiently attentive, as to whether someone is
guilty or innocent. Imagine we suspect someone to have committed
an offence, and so seek to punish them for that offence. This would
be punishment (we punish a supposed offender for his offence), and
so, if the offender turns out to be innocent, it would be a form of
accidental punishment. But our indifference toward their guilt would
be most concerning. Let’s call this indifference punishment. Saul
Smilansky has persuasively argued that whilst telishment is the form
of punishing the innocent that is usually used to object to conse-
quentialist theories, indifference punishments are just as much of a
concern.11
For the purposes of this essay, we are interested in telishment,
framing, and indifference punishments (i.e., not accidental punish-
ments). For ease, I will refer to these, collectively, as ‘the punishment
of the innocent’, notwithstanding the conceptual controversies I
have already alluded to. I take it that we are, to put it mildly, morally
concerned about all of these. Let’s call this concern the Innocence
Intuition. I will state it here as broadly as I can, because, like many of
our moral intuitions and convictions, it is merely a starting point for
philosophical inquiry and, in my own pre-theoretical judgments at
11 Saul Smilansky, ‘Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: the general problem’ in
Analysis 50 (1990): 256–261.
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least, is held in a vague way. I have also phrased it as an evaluative
intuition. This will be important as we go through, but it is, I think, a
natural way to phrase the initial intuition. It is appropriate to con-
front Tadros in particular on this evaluative ground, since his prin-
cipal disagreement with retributivism concerns not what it says
about what we should do, but rather what it says about how we
should evaluate the punishment of the guilty.12
The Innocence Intuition There is a fundamental moral distinction between punishing
the guilty, on one hand, and the harms done to innocent parties under telishment,
framing, and indifference punishments, on the other. All else equal, it is always
morally worse to punish the innocent than to punish the guilty.
We can draw three different kinds of lines when we think about
punishment. The first are factual, or descriptive, lines. Here we will
focus on one such line – the one between guilt and innocence.13 The
second are evaluative lines which morally distinguish different kinds
of punishment and what we should say and think about those
punishments (for example, whether incidences of punishment are
good or regrettable). The third are normative lines, which we draw
between permissible and impermissible punishments. The Innocence
Intuition draws an evaluative line, which tracks our factual
distinction between guilt and innocence. It notes two differences
between the two types of punishment: one of type and one of
degree. In terms of degree, all else equal, punishing the innocent is
always worse. In terms of type, it says (vaguely) that the distinction
between punishing the innocent and punishing the guilty is
fundamental. Punishing the innocent is not merely worse than
punishing the guilty – it is a distinctive form of badness. We will
hope that our theories of punishment, which primarily tell us when
and why punishment is permissible, will heed the Innocence
Intuition, both in that they will offer robust protection against
punishment for the innocent, and that they will explain and validate
the initial evaluative intuition.
12 Tadros writes: ‘I reject retributivism primarily because after reflecting on the lives of wrongdoers
I simply lack any conviction that their suffering is good.’ (‘Responses’ in Law and Philosophy 32 (2013):
241–325, at p. 259).
13 In order to set aside the issue of whether it is moral or legal guilt/innocence that matters, for the
purposes of this paper ‘the guilty’ have committed an act which is morally wrong, is morally permissible
to punish and has been criminalized. If we focus on moral guilt, this ‘factual’ line will have normative
commitments built into it.
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While some accidental punishment is inevitable in any system of
punishment, some may say that the kinds of punishment of the
innocent we are interested in here – telishment, framing, and
indifference punishment – are never permissible. They might
endorse something like this:
The Strong View It is always impermissible to telish or frame someone, or to punish
someone we merely suspect of having committed an offence.
Of course, telishment, framing, and indifference punishments are
clearly something that any actual system of punishment must be
designed to avoid. But there are extreme cases in which many of us
would endorse them. Imagine, for example, that a group of Ruth-
haters contacts the government and demands that Ruth be given one
month in prison. If she is not, they will carry out a terrorist atrocity,
with huge loss of life. Ruth is innocent. The Ruth-haters are only
demanding a very small amount of punishment. Since it is known
that Ruth is innocent, this would be telishment. Telishment is very
hard to justify, but if the stakes get high enough, as in this case, can’t
it be justified in extremis? We can modify this case to make it a
framing case. Imagine that the terrorists believe Ruth to have
committed an offence, and are demanding she is mildly punished for
this offence. Government officials can make it look as if Ruth did
indeed commit the offence, so as to trick police, jury, court, and
public into believing she committed it. They will then punish her.
Again, this kind of conduct looks like it may be permissible if the
stakes are high enough, and the punishment low enough. Finally, the
case can be amended to make a case of indifference punishment.
Imagine the government suspects Ruth of a crime, but cannot prove
it beyond reasonable doubt. The terrorists believe she committed the
crime, and are demanding she be punished for it. We might be
prepared to punish her for the crime, even though we are unsure of
her guilt or innocence.
If we endorse punishment in these cases, but want to continue to
pay attention to the Innocence Intuition, we might endorse this
(rather vague) normative principle:
The Moderate View Telishment, framing, and indifference punishments are only
permissible in extreme circumstances. The good produced by these punishments
must vastly outweigh the harm done to the punished person.
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Even though, in extreme circumstances, it allows us to punish those
we know to be innocent, a theory which leads us to the Moderate
View can nevertheless heed the Innocence Intuition in two senses.
Firstly, the Moderate View requires circumstances to be exceptional
before punishment of the innocent is permitted – it does not take
punishment of the innocent lightly, and sees it as harder to justify
than punishment of the guilty. Secondly, even when punishment of
the innocent is allowed, it allows us to retain (i.e., does not directly
contradict) the evaluative thought that there is something that is
troubling or regrettable about this punishment that is not there when
we punish the guilty. The permissible punishment of the innocent
can remain a different moral kettle of fish from the permissible
punishment of the guilty.
Traditionally, the punishment of the innocent is a stick with
which to beat instrumentalists – those who seek to justify punish-
ment by its extrinsic good effects. For example, consequentialists
who believe that punishment is justified whenever it does more
good than harm, must believe that whenever punishing the innocent
does enough good to outweigh the harm to the punished, it is
justified. Moreover, provided the good effects are the same, pun-
ishing an innocent person would be morally identical to punishing a
guilty person. Therefore, certain kinds of traditional consequentialist
theories (such as utilitarianism) do not appear to vindicate or explain
the Innocence Intuition, nor can they necessarily justify the limits we
want to see our criminal justice institutions respect. To the extent
that they can justify such limits, they appear to do so for the wrong
reasons – because punishing the innocent is ineffective, not because
there is something fundamentally morally troubling about it.
This has led many theorists to believe that the Innocence Intu-
ition, and the related normative positions explored above, speak in
favour of retributivist theories of punishment. It is clear that
retributivism can vindicate and explain the Innocence Intuition.
Because retributivists believe that the guilty deserve punishment,
while the innocent do not, right at the heart of the theory is the
fundamental moral distinction between the two types of punishment
that the Innocence Intuition requires. Even if a retributivist con-
cludes that innocent Ruth can be punished in order to avert a ter-
rorist atrocity, she can nevertheless hold on to the idea that there is a
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fundamental distinction between this punishment (undeserved, and
therefore bad, but permissible) and punishment of the guilty
(deserved, and therefore, at least pro tanto, good). That is, even
when she is prepared to shift the normative line that divides permissible
and impermissible punishment away from the factual guilt/innocence
divide, an evaluative line may remain on the guilt/innocence divide.
Yet precisely because these evaluative and normative lines can
come apart, the retributivist is not automatically in a better position
than the deterrence theorist when it comes to how much punish-
ment of the innocent they would allow. As Tadros clearly shows,
what he takes to be the basic retributivist claim – that punishment is
intrinsically good when and because it is deserved suffering, and is
intrinsically bad when and because it is undeserved suffering14 (i.e.,
the evaluative line corresponds to the factual one) – does not, on its
own, lead us to either of the normative view articulated above, and
thus will not necessarily place tight limits on the permissibility of the
punishment of the innocent (pp. 35–37).
So, retributivists are on firm ground with the Innocence Intuition,
but must show that their theories lead us to plausible normative
limits on the punishment on the innocent (which is not, of course, to
say that they cannot or have not done so). In what follows I will
argue that the Duty View finds itself in the opposite position. It can
place sensible normative limits on the punishment on the innocent
but, in doing so, it cannot, on its own, endorse or explain the
Innocence Intuition. This is, however, somewhat obscured from
view in the presentation of the Duty View, since Tadros tends to
write as if he endorses stricter limits on the punishment of the
innocent (namely, the Strong View) than he actually does, which
allows him to draw a bright normative line between innocence and
guilt. This bright normative line carries a kind of evaluative line with
it – permissible punishment and impermissible punishment should,
of course, be evaluated differently.15 However, once we shift the
normative line to be in accordance with Tadros’ actual views, we
14 Tadros’ characterisation of retributivism is controversial. In particular, it does not incorporate
‘negative’ or ‘limiting’ retributivism. Larry Alexander claims that it is ‘easy as pie’ to justify punishment
on grounds like Tadros’ if one makes use of desert as a limitation on punishment. See his ‘Can Self-
Defense Justify Punishment?’ in Law and Philosophy 32 (2013): 159–175, at p. 159. One way to read
Tadros’ project, and related views, is as an attempt to develop a position that will provide similar
conclusions to the negative retributivist position, but without relying on the concept of desert.
15 Larry S. Temkin, Rethinking the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 10, n.8.
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find that (unlike the retributivist) his evaluative line shifts with it,
leaving Tadros’ theory with no normative or evaluative line between
the innocent and the guilty.
III. THE DUTY VIEW
Tadros’ argument for the Duty View begins with a rejection of the
retributivist claim that the suffering of offenders is intrinsically good.
Like all instrumentalists about punishment, Tadros sees punishment
as a necessary evil. But Tadros aims to present an instrumental
theory which provides the tight limits on punishment that conse-
quentialists fail to provide. Tadros declares that a major advantage of
his theory is its position on the punishment of the innocent, which
he repeatedly claims his theory declares to be wrong and thus
impermissible.16 Thus, Tadros writes as if the Duty View endorses
the Strong View on the punishment of the innocent.
The theory which will deliver these limits stems from an analysis
of the ‘means principle’. Instrumentalist theories of punishment, and
especially theories like Tadros’ which appeal to general deterrence,
are often objected to on the grounds that they use people as a means to
some end.17 Tadros endorses the means principle (the principle
which states that it is usually wrong to use people in this way), but
argues that it has important limits. Forcibly using people is not
always wrong: ‘It is often permissible to harm a person as a means to
a greater good, I claim, if that person would themselves have a duty
to pursue that good even if doing so would harm them to that
16 Here are a series of claims that Tadros makes about punishing the innocent: the innocent may not
be punished (p. 40); punishing the innocent is (or seems) unjust (pp. 42, 314); the Duty View ‘requires us
not to punish the innocent’ (p. 42); ‘Most people think that…punishment of the innocent…violate[s]
basic moral requirements – doing these things is fundamentally unjust rather than merely imprudent’
(p. 138); the Duty View shows how it is permissible to ‘punish the guilty for reasons of general
deterrence’ (p. 138); punishing the innocent ‘seems wrong, even if this will prevent greater harms,
because it would harm the innocent person as a means to the greater good’ (p. 265); ‘The idea [of the
Duty View] is to show that although it is generally wrong to harm a person as a means to the good of
others, explaining why punishment of the innocent is wrong, it may be permissible to harm offenders as a
means to the good of others’ (pp. 265–266) [furthermore, for Tadros, if some conduct is wrong, that is ‘a
morally decisive reason not to do it’ (p. 217)]; ‘committing a crime is a necessary condition of punishment’
(p. 276) (all emphases mine). In ‘Responses’ Tadros continues to write as if his theory only justifies the
punishment of guilty – in his summary of the Duty View (p. 242) he implies that only ‘offenders’ are
liable to punishment. In his more recent Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
Tadros appears more relaxed about the punishment of the innocent, though, importantly, he has in
mind criminalizing innocent conduct, rather than punishing those innocent of criminal conduct. See,
especially, chs. 6 and 17.
17 Daniel M. Farrell also accepts this as the major challenge to instrumental theories. See Daniel M.
Farrell, ‘The Justification of Deterrent Violence’ in Ethics 100 (1990): 301–317, at p. 301.
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degree’ (p. 117). Tadros adds that the duty must be enforceable, and
whilst not all duties are enforceable, when a duty is grounded in the
avoidance of very serious harm to others, it will typically be
enforceable (i.e., we will have no right to do wrong) (p. 131). Tadros’
thought is that what is wrong about harming a person as a means to
an end is that we use them in the service of some goal. This is
permissible when they are morally required to have taken that as
their goal at the same cost (p. 129).
Tadros argues that punishment can be justified as an enforceable
duty to deter future wrongdoing. Offenders, says Tadros, have duties
to their victims. They have failed in their primary duty – not to harm
their victim – and so acquire secondary duties, duties to do the next
best thing. And these duties require that they protect their past
victims from future harms, if they can do so at proportionate cost
(pp. 265–277).18 One way that they can protect their past victims
from future harms is through being punished, if this means that
others are deterred from harming their victims in the future. Tadros
goes on to argue that, where they cannot protect their own victim
specifically, offenders have (enforceable) duties to form arrange-
ments that enable them to protect one another’s victims, and that
rights to be protected can be transferred from victims to their
friends, family and fellow citizens (pp. 280–281). If both these
extensions to offenders’ liabilities (from specific victim to victims
generally, and from victims generally to citizens generally) are valid,
then we get from an initial duty of protection owed by the offender
to his victim, to a duty to protect society generally. Where pun-
ishment protects society, it is permissible if the costs of punishment
do not exceed those that the offender had a duty to accept.
One important element of his theory that Tadros finds attractive is
this: The harms that punishment imposes are bad and stay bad. Unlike
retributivism, where the harms of punishment can be transformed
into a good through desert (which Hart called the ‘moral alchemy’ of
retributivism19), on the Duty View people may become liable to harm
through their choices to engage in criminal conduct, but the harm
18 At this point, Tadros’ theory differs in important ways from Daniel Farrell’s related self-defence
based account, as for Farrell, we can only punish in order to avert threats against victims which
offenders themselves have created, whereas for Tadros the duty is a duty to protect victims against any
threats they face. See: Farrell, ‘The Justification of General Deterrence’.
19 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 234–235.
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remains a necessary evil. As Tadros puts it, we can recognise that
offenders have duties to be harmed which others do not, ‘But in
recognizing that they have such a duty we need not appeal to the idea
that harming them will be in any way good, or else less bad, than the
harm that would be inflicted on other people’ (p. 53).
IV. PUNISHING THE INNOCENT: THE NORMATIVE STANCE
In the previous section, I showed that Tadros often claims that his
theory supports the Strong View – the view that punishment of the
innocent is always impermissible. In this section I want to show two
things. The first is that Tadros’ theory, at its most general level,
doesn’t lead us to any particular conclusion about whether or when
punishing the innocent is permissible or impermissible. The second is
that if we look to Tadros’ statements about various other things
(including, in particular, duties of rescue) his more specific version of
the Duty View doesn’t rule out punishing the innocent. Rather, it will
most likely support a (better specified) version of the Moderate View,
which allows for the punishment of the innocent in exceptional cases.
This second claim is, I believe, both clarificatory and sympathetic.
It is developed from Tadros’ own arguments and I think that I show
that Tadros’ specific version of the Duty View actually delivers more
plausible restrictions on the punishment of the innocent than those
he often claims for it. However, since Tadros places such weight on
his theory delivering the right restrictions on punishing the innocent
(this is, after all, what distinguishes it from a pure consequentialist
deterrence theory), and often declares that punishing the innocent is
impermissible, it is important to show both that his general theory
doesn’t have a concrete position on if and when we can permissibly
punish the innocent (indeed, it is fully compatible with the conse-
quentialist theories that he aims to provide an alternative to), and
that his specific version of the theory actually allows the punishment
of the innocent.20
20 Others have taken Tadros at his word on this. In his paper on Tadros’ theory, Douglas Husak
clearly takes Tadros to have argued that only the guilty are liable to punishment. He writes: ‘[H]ard
questions about the moral status of punishing the innocent should be posed to all theo-
rists . . . Retributivists can ask Tadros: why confine punishment to those said to be liable to it?’
(Douglas Husak, ‘Retributivism in Extremis’ in Law and Philosophy 32 (2013): 3–31 at p. 16, emphasis in
original). I think Husak’s presumption (that Tadros means to confine punishment to the liable, and that
only the guilty are liable) is an understandable way to read Tadros (see note 16). I seek here to show
that it is nevertheless the wrong way to read him.
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To see how limits to the use of punishment cannot be read
straight from the general version of Tadros’ view, here is a recon-
struction of the general idea of the Duty View.21
DV1 Harming someone as a means to the greater good is usually wrong.
DV2 An exception to the means principle (DV1) occurs when the person has an
enforceable duty to take on a given level of cost (harm) in order to achieve some
end. It is then permissible to impose those costs (harm them to that degree) if
doing so is necessary to achieving that end.
DV3 Therefore, punishment is permissible harm when and because a person has an
enforceable duty to assist people up to a certain cost.
DV4 Offenders acquire such duties through past wrongdoing.
What does this tell us about the limits to punishment? Nothing.
Tadros focuses our attention on the duties that criminals have toward
their victims (DV4), but this tells us nothing about the limits to
punishment because it tells us about one group of people who have
duties to incur costs (be harmed), and says nothing about who else has
such duties, or does not have such duties. It would be possible for me
to sign up to the Duty View in this general form, and have just about
any position on the punishment of the innocent: that telishment is
never justified, is justified in highly constrained circumstances, or is
justified whenever it will do more good than harm. It all depends on
what enforceable duties the innocent have, and the view as it is
presented is silent on that (other than general assertions about the
Duty View not allowing the punishment the innocent (see note 16)).
So, just as the general view of retributivism cannot necessarily protect
the innocent (pp. 35–37), neither can the general Duty View.
That the Duty View in its general form can support punishing the
innocent whenever it will do more good than harm is worthy of
note. Tadros claims that his theory is non-consequentialist and this
claim appears to be based on his endorsement of, and his theory
preceding from, the non-consequentialist means principle. But Ta-
dros amends the means principle in such a way that it becomes
completely compatible with consequentialism. Consequentialists (at
least as traditionally understood) cannot endorse the principle that
we must never treat a person as a means, for they will think it
permissible to (for example) push someone off a bridge in order to
21 See also Tadros’ own summary in ‘Responses’, p. 242.
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stop a trolley that will otherwise kill five people. But the conse-
quentialist can endorse the principle that we may only treat a person
as a means when they have (or would have) a duty to act in that
way, because (for example) they will believe that the person on the
bridge has a duty to jump, or to allow themselves to be pushed
(since it will do more good than harm). Therefore, Tadros’ ‘non-
consequentialist’ principle is amended or clarified in such a way as to
make it perfectly compatible with consequentialism. This is not to
say that Tadros’ view is a consequentialist one, but that the non-
consequentialist character of the theory does not stem from the
amended means principle. Instead, the substantive claims about who
has what duties to be harmed provide the non-consequentialist
character of the theory.
Moving on to Tadros’ more specific view on duties, Tadros’
official view is that the Duty View endorses The Strong View on the
punishment of the innocent. Yet Tadros often reminds us that we
sometimes have duties to bear costs in order to avert harm to others
even when we are not responsible for the creation of the threat and have not
harmed anyone else. For example, Tadros argues that if I could save
your life at minimal cost (for example, sustaining some bruising),
then I have an enforceable duty to sustain the harm (p. 129). This
means that others can force me to sustain these costs in order to
achieve the same end. Given these enforceable duties of rescue,
surely Ruth has an enforceable duty to be mildly harmed (telished) in
order to avert the terrorist threat. Similarly, since Ruth would have
an enforceable duty to confess to a crime she didn’t commit (in order
to avert disastrous consequences), framing her would also appear to
be permissible. Finally, consider the case in which we suspect Ruth
of having committed the crime, but in which the Ruth-haters are
demanding punishment. In such a case, Ruth has an enforceable duty
either way – either she committed the crime and has a duty in
accordance with DV4, or she didn’t and has a duty in accordance with
the duties of rescue Tadros affirms. Therefore, we can harm Ruth
through punishment even though we only suspect her of guilt, since
we can be sure that she has a duty to be suffer the harm.
Therefore, to the initial description of the Duty View, we can add
the following claim, which makes it compatible with the Moderate
View:
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DV5: When the goods vastly outweigh the costs, the innocent have enforceable
duties to be harmed in order to assist others. This means that telishment, framing,
and indifference punishment can, in rare circumstances, be justified.
As I have made clear from the outset, when the punishments are
mild enough and the stakes high enough, it seems plausible that the
innocent can be permissibly punished. And it seems plausible to say
that, in such circumstances, the innocent have a duty to submit to
punitive institutions. For example, Ruth would act wrongly if she
absconded and allowed the terrorist atrocity to occur. So I think the
fact that a specified version of Tadros’ theory can lead us to this
conclusion is a welcome result for that theory – this claim is
sympathetic and clarificatory. However, even if Tadros were to be
upfront about this, and modify his stance by saying that the
punishment of the innocent is ordinarily impermissible, we find a
new problem: Once we are clear that the Duty View’s normative
line does not lie exactly along the guilt/innocence divide, this has
serious ramifications for the theory’s evaluative claims.
V. PUNISHING THE INNOCENT: THE EVALUATIVE STANCE
The real worry about the Duty View (and duty-based theories of
punishment in general) is how they evaluate the permissible pun-
ishment of the innocent. Consider, again, the Ruth case, and com-
pare it with this case: Sarah is required to endure punishment, thus
deterring others, because she murdered someone. She is given fifteen
years in prison, which prevents three murders. Recall that, on Ta-
dros’ view we are not to see the suffering of wrongdoers as good, but
rather as a necessary evil justified by the good effects that it has, and
the fact that the person has a duty to bring about those good effects.
The suffering of the guilty is not good, nor less bad, than the suf-
fering of the innocent (p. 53).
Imagine that you are a guard walking down the hallway between
Sarah and Ruth’s cells, and you are one of the small number who has
been made aware of Ruth’s innocence. Of course, you should feel
differently toward Sarah than you do toward Ruth – Ruth is inno-
cent, whilst Sarah has committed a horrendous wrong. But accord-
ing to the Duty View you should view their suffering in the same
way, as morally equivalent. Both are suffering, which is bad in
both cases. But both are suffering because it’s their duty, so their
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punishment is permissible. On Tadros’ theory as it stands, there is, so
far as I can see, nothing more to say. And this is true of any view
which couples Bentham’s view of punishment as a necessary evil
with the idea that duty can justify that evil being imparted on the
innocent. The two punishments are morally equivalent, there is no
significant moral distinction between them.
The Innocence Intuition, as I initially formulated it, made two
claims. First, there is a fundamental moral distinction between
punishing the innocent and punishing the guilty. Second, when all
else is equal, punishing the innocent is worse than punishing the
guilty. Ruth is suffering mild harm in order to avert a very serious
threat, whilst Sarah is suffering a major harm to avoid a lesser threat,
so the cost-benefit ratios of the two punishments are importantly
different, and so all else is not equal. Since all else is not equal, the
Duty View does not (as yet) conflict with the second claim, but it
does conflict with the first part of the Innocence Intuition. For
retributivists, there is always a fundamental moral difference be-
tween punishing the innocent and the guilty, even when both are
permissible. For Tadros both are evaluated in the same way – the
harm is bad but the person has a duty to suffer it.
A defender of the Duty View may claim that she has no trouble
seeing these two punishments as morally equivalent – Ruth’s minor
suffering is doing so much more good than Sarah’s major suffering.
But what if we alter the variables? Let Ruth’s punishment remain as
it was: a minor punishment to avert a very serious threat. But let’s
also say that Sarah and Ruth live in an exceedingly law-abiding
society, and that there is only one other threat, and it is of an equally
serious nature. However, in order to avert it, we need only punish
Sarah a little bit. The exact same amount as Ruth, in fact. Since,
according to the Duty View, permissible punishment is a duty to
suffer necessary harm, then we cannot punish Sarah any more than
the tiny amount required to avert the threat. Now the cost-benefit
ratios between the two cases are uniform. But the Duty View still
views them as equivalents. Being guilty may raise the amount of
harm you potentially have a duty to incur to in order to avoid harm
(i.e., we can do more to Sarah to avoid the same harm than we can
to Ruth), but within the boundaries of harm to which we potentially have
a duty to bear all harm is, for Tadros, on a par – permissible but
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regrettable. Therefore, now with all else equal, the Duty View still
cannot differentiate between the cases, and so the Duty View clashes
with the second part of the Innocence Intuition.
A defender of the Duty View might be tempted to claim that a
significant difference is to be found in the fact that Ruth’s punish-
ment is nearer the potential maximum harm she could be permis-
sibly forced to bear, whilst Sarah is only suffering a tiny proportion
of the harm to which she is potentially liable. But it is hard to see
why this would lead us to evaluate the harms suffered by the two
persons differently from one another. That would require us believe
that harms are more troubling the nearer they are to the person’s
maximum potential duty. But that would introduce distinctions in
harming within permissible harms, which would seem to conflict
with Tadros’ basic idea that all permissible harms are just as bad as
each other (p. 53).
When Tadros rejects retributivism, he focuses on the way in
which it transmutes harm from ordinarily bad to sometimes good.
This causes Tadros to reject the ‘moral valence’ of harm – the idea
that our evaluations of harm can shift according to the moral situ-
ation of the person who suffers them. But our rejection of the moral
valence of harm can take two forms – a stronger and a weaker form.
These are as follows:
Strong Rejection of Moral Valence a person’s guilt cannot alter the moral evaluation
of their suffering.
Moderate Rejection of Moral Valence a person’s guilt cannot make a person’s suffering
good.
Tadros argues for the Strong Rejection, in denying that the suffering
of the guilty can be good or less bad. But the Moderate Rejection
allows for the possibility of the permissible punishment of the
innocent being less bad than the permissible punishment of the
guilty, whilst still rejecting the claim that many of us find difficult to
accept in retributivism – that the suffering of offenders is good.
Moderate Rejection would thus allow us to begin to do justice to the
Innocence Intuition.
Let us take stock. Thus far, I have shown that Tadros’ substantive
view allows for the permissible telishment, framing, and indifference
punishing of the innocent in extreme circumstances. I have also
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shown that this view, when coupled with Tadros’ claim that the
suffering of offenders is not good, and is not less bad than that of the
innocent, is at odds with the Innocence Intuition. One possibility is
to abandon this Strong Rejection of moral valence in favour of
Moderate Rejection. Another possibility is to find some other fun-
damental moral distinction between the harms suffered by offenders
and those suffered by innocents. However, such claims must be
justified – we need to find a moral difference between the harms
suffered in fulfilling the duties of the innocent and those suffered in
fulfilling the duties of the guilty.
VI. CHOICES
In the remainder of this article, I want to explore three possible re-
sponses to the problems identified above. All require amendments to
the Duty View as currently stated. Two, which I find wanting, are
developed from Tadros’ writings. I develop a third, focusing on rights,
which I cannot fully defend here, but which I believe to be more
promising. There are doubtless different ways to respond as well.
What could the adherent of the Duty View say in order to dif-
ferentiate between Sarah and Ruth’s punishments? Here is one thing
they could say: Sarah chose to commit her crime, and thus placed
herself in harm’s way, while Ruth just ended up in harm’s way – it
wasn’t her choice. However, we should observe at the outset that
without further argument this is simply a descriptive difference that
distinguishes how Sarah and Ruth came to have their respective
duties – it is not yet an evaluative moral difference concerning their
having these duties and the harms they suffer in discharging them.
Tadros makes a great deal of the moral significance of choice.22
But the significance he attaches to it concerns the way in which it
can render harm as a means to an end permissible. He points to it as
one of the ways (and, perhaps, the major way) in which we can
acquire duties to be harmed, but nothing he says seems to suggest
that he views it as a morally distinctive way of acquiring duties which
would alter the moral evaluations of the harms that lie downstream
of those choices (see, especially, p. 58). He says nothing about
whether, how, or why we should view harms done to those who
22 See, for example, pp. 52–58, 169–181, 230–232, 291.
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acquire duties in this way differently from harms done to those (like
Ruth) who acquire them in other ways, he simply makes it clear that
choice is a particularly easy way to justify liability to harm since we
had the opportunity to avoid the harm.
However, in attempting to explain the significance of the moral
difference between Sarah’s situation and that of Ruth, it seems
natural to reach for the fact that Sarah acquired her duties through
choice. Since Tadros thinks the significance of wrongdoing and culpa-
bility in the criminal law is to be found entirely in the significance of
choice – ‘an account based on choice can fully explain the role that
culpability has in determining who is liable to be harmed’ (p. 58) –
and we are trying to find a distinction between wrongdoers and non-
wrongdoers, it is a natural place to search for a moral difference.
Here, however, is a reason to doubt that the significance of choice
can fully capture the significance of culpability or wrongdoing. Next
to Sarah and Ruth’s cells is Beth’s cell. A few weeks ago, a terrorist
organisation contacted the government and said that unless one
innocent person (but it didn’t matter who) was punished (by
imprisonment for one month), they would commit a terrorist
atrocity. Beth was working in the government office at the time the
call was taken and volunteered to take the punishment (call this case
Beth 1). Now, we may think differently of Beth’s predicament than
we do of Ruth’s, since Beth chose her punishment while Ruth did not.
But what is relevant here is that we should think of Beth’s situation as
importantly morally different from Sarah’s, even though both find
themselves punished through their choices (Sarah through her choice
to murder, Beth through her choice to take the punishment).
Indeed, if we put the significance of wrongdoing entirely down to
the significance of choice, we should possibly see Sarah’s punishment
as more troubling than Beth’s, for while Sarah only chose to perform
conduct that might incur a duty to suffer harm (recall that on the
Duty View punishment must be necessary to avert some future harm,
so it is at least theoretically possible that, if there were no further
harms or potential crimes to be prevented, Sarah would not acquire
any duties to suffer harm), Beth chose to submit herself to harm – her
suffering is more directly connected to her choice. Another way of
putting this is this: Sarah acquires a duty to suffer harm because of
her choices; Beth chooses to acquire a duty to suffer harm.
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Perhaps it might be objected here that the relevant difference
between Beth and Sarah (and indeed Ruth) is that Beth does not
actually have a duty to be harmed or punished – she has generously
chosen to be punished but has no such duty. However, in volun-
teering, Beth acquires a duty, like we do when we make promises –
we choose to acquire the duty, but it is nevertheless still a duty.
Imagine this alternative case (which we can call Beth 2). As in Beth 1,
Beth initially volunteers to be punished. After a week or so, how-
ever, Beth is tired of being punished and withdraws her consent.
However, if we release her now, the terrorists will carry out their
threat. We have to keep punishing Beth. And Beth now has a duty to
suffer, and to submit herself to continued punishment. Therefore,
she has – through her choices – acquired a duty to suffer. So, she is in
the same situation as Sarah. Yet even though both Sarah and Beth
have voluntarily acquired duties to be harmed, their situations, and
how we think of the harms that they suffer, are not the same.
Therefore, I think the significance of choice, whilst important, can-
not on its own determine or account for the important moral dis-
tinction between the permissible punishment of the innocent and the
punishment of the guilty.
VII. THE BADNESS OF HARM VS. CARING ABOUT HARM?
In his responses to other critics Tadros has raised an idea which
could help the Duty View to make the distinctions that the Inno-
cence Intuition requires. There, Tadros makes a distinction between
the (impersonal) disvalue of some instance of harm, and how much
we (from our individual perspectives) ought to care about some
instance of harm. As an example, my child being harmed is just as
serious as your child being harmed from an impersonal point of
view. But I ought to care about the harm to my child more than I care
about the harm to yours. Translated to punishment, Tadros’ thought
is that offenders’ suffering is just as bad (impersonally) as the suf-
fering of the innocent, but we have less reason to care about the
suffering of offenders.23 This would give us a firm line between
wrongdoers and the innocent that does not appeal (only) to choice.
23 Tadros, ‘Responses’, pp. 257–259.
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But this stance raises at least as many questions as it answers. It
says that the lives and suffering of offenders should matter less to
me, in the same way that your child matters less to me than mine
does. However, in the case of our children, my personal relationship
with my child gives me clear reasons to care more about my child
than yours. In the case of Sarah and Ruth, since (we can imagine) I
don’t know either of them, it is less clear why I should care less about
Sarah and her suffering. The only plausible explanation is that Sarah
has lost standing of some kind – she used to be just like Ruth in my
eyes, and now she isn’t. This raises two questions. First, why should
Sarah have lost this standing – on what grounds should I take it away
from her, or regard her as no longer possessing it? It is hard to make
a case without appealing to something like desert, the rejection of
which animates the entire project of constrained instrumentalism.
Second, does this stance really capture the way we view the harms
done to offenders? As every bit as morally bad as those done to the
innocent, but that we simply mind less? This stance gives us a line
between the punishment of the innocent and the punishment of the
guilty, but is it the right line? The proposed line doesn’t appear to
vindicate the Innocence Intuition fully.
VIII. RIGHTS TALK TO THE RESCUE?
In this section I want to explore what I think is the most promising
way for the Duty View to accommodate the Innocence Intuition. It
has the following virtues. First, it explains, rather than merely pos-
tulates, the kind of loss of standing which the response examined in
the previous section relies on. Second, it does so without invoking a
mysterious separation between the disvalue or moral status of some
harm and how much we should care about it – the actual moral
status of the harms really do differ. Third, it does so without
returning to notions of desert, the rejection of which animates much
of the rationale for the Duty View in the first place.
This strategy involves incorporating the concept of rights more
fully into the Duty View. There are two important ideas about rights
that need to be invoked here. The first is the distinction that some
philosophers draw between rights violation and rights infringement.
A right is infringed when an act implicates the right but is permissible.
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A right is violated when an act implicates the right and is imper-
missible.24 Some theorists think that all punishment implicates rights.
That is, we all always have a right not to be punished, but sometimes
the state can infringe that right (for example, when it is deserved
and/or necessary).25 If we adopt this line here, however, then we
will have no resources with which to make the distinction between
the permissible punishment of the innocent and the permissible
punishment of the guilty, for both forms of permissible punishment
then infringe rights.
Other philosophers do not think that all punishment implicates
rights. Rather, they think that, ordinarily, those who may be pun-
ished are those who have forfeited their right not to be punished.26
This idea of forfeiture is the second important idea about rights.
We can combine these two ideas: that rights can be forfeited, and
that they can be permissibly implicated (infringed). This allows us to
make a three-way distinction. Firstly, there are those who may
permissibly be punished since they have forfeited their rights (the
guilty). (While some, such as Wellman,27 think that rights forfeiture
is a sufficient condition for being punished for any reason, within a
constrained instrumentalism framework we would want to say an
offender forfeits his rights against being used in certain ways.
Therefore only useful punishment would be permitted). Then there
are those who have not forfeited their rights (the innocent) but who,
in extremis, may be permissibly punished. These people have their
rights infringed (and therefore will be entitled to compensation if this
is possible). Finally, there are those (the innocent in ordinary cir-
cumstances) who may not permissibly be punished. These people, if
they are punished, have their rights violated.
Thus far, we have some different ways in which it may be per-
missible to punish people. Let us add that harm that infringes rights
is importantly morally different from harm that does not implicate
24 For a proponent of this distinction, see Joel Feinberg, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable
Right to Life’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 93–123. For criticism, see John Oberdiek, ‘Lost in
Moral Space: on the infrininging/violating distinction and its place in the theory of rights’ in Law and
Philosophy 23 (2004): 325–346; and Alec Walen, ‘Innocent Threats vs. Innocent Bystanders: A Case-Study
in Rights Theory (unpublished m/s). Walen advocates using claims, in the same way that I consider
below.
25 Husak, Overcriminalization, p. 96.
26 For a recent defence of this view, see Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory
of Punishment’ in Ethics 122 (2012): 371–393.
27 Ibid., p. 375.
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rights at all. In addition, it seems right to add this evaluative claim:
all else equal, situations in which rights are infringed are worse than
those in which they are not implicated. The advantage of adopting
these (independently plausible) positions here is that they allow us to
adopt the Moderate Rejection of Moral Valence. Since the suffering
of offenders does not implicate rights (since offenders have forfeited
rights), it is not as bad as the suffering of those whose rights are
implicated. We can now say the following. First, there is a funda-
mental moral difference between the harms to Sarah, who has for-
feited her right, and those to Ruth, who has not, and therefore
retains her right against punishment, even though both are per-
missibly punished. Second, all else equal, Ruth’s suffering is morally
worse, and to be regretted to a greater extent. These two claims
allow us to endorse and explain the Innocence Intuition. Third, this
account marks the difference between the treatment of Sarah and the
treatment of Ruth in a way that captures what, intuitively, is im-
portant about the difference. When we permissibly punish an inno-
cent person like Ruth, we do not act impermissibly, but we
nevertheless act in a way that is morally tainted by the rights
infringement.
While they occupy similar territory, rights forfeiture theory and
the Duty View are independent theories of punishment. The Duty
View seems committed to the idea of rights forfeiture (for guilty
persons), as, in acquiring an enforceable duty to submit to punished,
they forfeit their right against it. But the forfeiture view doesn’t
necessarily lead us to a Duty View – it is consistent with my for-
feiting a right against punishment that I have no duty to submit to
punishment.28 And it is consistent with the Duty View that innocents
who have enforceable duties to submit to punishment lack rights
against punishment, rather than have their rights infringed. Given
this, so far, perhaps what we have is an argument for abandoning the
Duty View and switching to rights forfeiture.
But recall why we find duty-based theories compelling in the first
place: It seems right to say that Sarah does something wrong when
she evades punishment and therefore fails to provide the deterrent
she would otherwise provide. And it also seems right to say not only
that Ruth may be punished, but that she also has a duty to submit to
28 I am grateful to Kit Wellman for discussion here.
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punishment, given that the goods produced by her mild suffering
will so vastly outweigh the harms. If, like me, you find both the
rights-based and the duty-based stories compelling, is there a way to
combine them?
There are three main problems or challenges in trying to tack this
three-way view of rights and punishment onto a duty-based view. One
is that it requires us to see rights in a certain way, which is itself
controversial. The idea of rights infringements requires us to view
rights as inputs to deciding what is permissible. They weigh against a
course of action, but don’t necessarily block it as impermissible. In-
deed, Tadros himself argues against seeing rights talk as independent
of, rather than following from, what is and is not permissible (p. 201).29
My own view is that the idea of rights infringement is an important and
independently plausible one, but I cannot defend that any further here.
A more serious, second, problem is that to adopt this position on
rights alongside the Duty View requires us to endorse the following,
very odd statement: Ruth has an enforceable duty to bear a given
level of harm, and a right not to be harmed to the same level. It is
one thing to say that we can have a right not to be punished and yet
can permissibly have punishment forced upon us (though Tadros
denies that we should say this, pp. 199–201). But it seems a further
conceptual leap to say that I have an enforceable duty to U and that I
have a right not to be forced to U.30 It seems more intuitive to say
that, while the innocent person has not forfeited her right, she nev-
ertheless lacks a right against punishment. However, Jeff McMahan
argues convincingly that this is a conceptual possibility: For example,
if your duty is to allow yourself to be killed by unjust aggressors in
order to save the whole world, he argues, you have a duty to allow
this to occur, but also a right against being killed by the aggressors.31
McMahan’s example might avoid the strange conceptual combina-
tion of ‘right against’ and ‘duty to’ because the right is held against a
different group of people to whom the duty is owed. In McMahan’s
29 Elsewhere Tadros has used the concept of rights infringement. See his ‘Duty and Liability’ in
Utilitas 24 (2012): 259–277, at pp. 266–277, where Tadros says killing innocent civilians who are not liable
to be killed may still be permissible but would infringe their rights. However, since Ruth has a duty to be
punished, then Tadros would nevertheless not view her as having a right not be punished.
30 Tadros himself has written: ‘It makes little sense to say that I have an enforceable duty to bear a
harm, and yet that I have a right not to be harmed’ and that ‘we cannot have both an enforceable duty
to bear some burden and a right not to bear that burden.’ See ‘Duty and Liability’, pp. 262–263.
31 Jeff McMahan, ‘Individual Liability in War: a response to Fabre, Leveringhaus, and Tadros’ in
Utilitas 24 (2012): 278–299, at p. 295.
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example you hold the right against the unjust aggressors, whilst the
duty is owed toward the rest of humankind. But imagine that the
invaders insisted that your fellow humans (those who will be saved)
are the ones who do the killing. This still seems to be a case in which
you have a right not to be killed, and a duty to be killed.
Perhaps we can make sense of this if we more carefully specify the
duty to be harmed, in the following way: The duty is a duty to allow
your right to be infringed.32 That is, you keep your right but you have
an enforceable duty to allow others to act contrary to that right. This
would mark not only a difference in rights between Ruth and Sarah,
but a difference in the content of their duties (as Sarah has forfeited
her rights against being harmed, her duty cannot be to allow her
right to be infringed).
This may seem conceptually bizarre, but consider the following
situation. After Ruth’s punishment, the Ruth-haters pack up and
leave us alone – their demands have been fulfilled. What should we
do with Ruth now? She should surely be compensated – she has
suffered (mild) punishment in order to avert harm to others. Yet we
wouldn’t want to compensate Sarah. Both had a duty to be harmed
in this way, but one is entitled to compensation. Allowing that Ruth
retained a right against this punishment, whilst Sarah did not, allows
us to make sense of the judgement that Ruth can claim compensa-
tion while Sarah cannot.
What does this rights-based version of the Duty View allow us to
say about Beth, who, recall, volunteers for punishment? The idea
that rights may be infringed or forfeited may appear to put Beth on
the same side of things as Sarah. Beth, in volunteering to be pun-
ished, appears to waive her right not to be punished – in other
words, she, like Sarah, appears to lack such a right. This is a third
problem for endorsing such an amendment to the Duty View. To
provide a separation between Sarah and Beth, we’d need to provide
a separation between forfeiting and waiving a right. This could be
achieved if, at least sometimes, waiving a right involves allowing
others to infringe one’s right, rather than removing it altogether.
Perhaps rights infringement is not the best way to describe what
happens to Ruth and Beth. An alternative would be to say that, whilst
they lack rights against being punished (having waived them or by
32 I am grateful to Mitch Berman for useful discussion here.
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simply not having them), they retain a claim against being punished.
They have (or acquire) duties not to press this claim, but it remains
there, explaining both the evaluative difference between the harms
done to them and Sarah (who has no such claim), and why they
should be compensated once pressing their claim becomes permis-
sible. The key point in both of these ways of explaining what happens
in these three cases is this. The guilty (Sarah) not only have a duty to
be punished, they lack any complaint about being punished, and have
no claim to be compensated. The innocent (Beth and Ruth) also have
duties to be punished, but there remains some block against their
being punished which is overridden by the duty. This block, whether
understood as a right or a claim, furnishes us with a moral distinction
between the punishments, and with a ground for compensation
should the opportunity arise. Crucially, the remaining block against
punishment also allows us to make an evaluative distinction between
the harms suffered in line with the duties: The harms are less bad
when they do not meet rights or claims against the harms.
I cannot here defend all of these controversial positions one would
need to endorse in adopting the rights-influenced variant of the Duty
View that I have sketched here. I think the duty-based view’s problems
run deep enough that we must turn to rights forfeiture and infringe-
ment (or something like it) in order to explain the difference between
punishing the guilty and the innocent. I have tried to explain, how-
ever, why the idea of duty remains compelling in this context. Given
this, I think we have reason to try to couple the views together.
It is worth outlining how much Tadros, or a supporter of the
Duty View, would need to alter their view in order to endorse this
position. Since Tadros’ view is sometimes described as a rights for-
feiture view, and is closely aligned with the self-defence literature in
which rights forfeiture is a central concept, it is worth exploring how
far we move away from the view if we endorse the duty- and rights
forfeiture- based hybrid I have outlined here.33 First, I think, a key
distinction is that, for Tadros, having a duty to suffer harm in the
name of harm reduction is supposed to explain why the offender
lacks a right against punishment. Therefore, the Duty View is sup-
posed to be a deeper story than the rights forfeiture view. But this
way of thinking of things would need some finessing if we accept the
33 I am grateful to a Law and Philosophy referee for encouraging me to address this.
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view that I have been exploring here, since some who have a duty to
suffer harm (the innocent) would retain their rights against that
harm. So the acquisition of a duty to suffer harm could no longer, on
its own, explain the lack of or loss of a right against harm. Second,
Tadros is (understandably) resistant to the claim that we can have an
enforceable duty to U and a right against others forcing us to U. A
perhaps more palatable claim that I have investigated involved
having an enforceable duty to U and a claim against being forced to
U. But one of these claims would need to be accepted. Finally,
Tadros is against a person’s moral misdeed’s affecting the moral
status of their suffering in any way (i.e., he endorses the Strong
Rejection of Moral Valence). The position explored here eschews the
Strong Rejection in favour of the Moderate Rejection: harms that
meet rights (or claims) against that harm are evaluated differently
from those that do not – they are less bad. Another alteration from
Tadros’ explicit claims is that the innocent sometimes have duties to
submit to penal institutions: punishment of the innocent can be
justified in extremis.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this essay I have examined duty-based variants of constrained
instrumentalism about punishment, and in particular Victor Tadros’
Duty View of punishment, focussing on what they say (or can say)
about the punishment of the innocent. Tadros’ theory is a philo-
sophically rich one which attempts to find a way to justify the harms
of punishment as necessary evils, whilst maintaining tight limits on
who will be subject to punishment.
Since these limits on punishment are held by Tadros to be an
important element of the theory’s attractiveness, it is important to
look at this aspect of the theory. Once we do, however, I think the
theory, as it stands, has problems. To summarize, above I have tried
to show: that the general Duty View takes no stance on if or when
the punishment of the innocent is justified – that work is done by
claims about what duties to be punished the innocent do or don’t
have; that the specific version of the Duty View which Tadros
proposes, and which is most intuitively plausible, actually says that
knowingly and intentionally punishing the innocent can be justified,
despite Tadros’ various statements to the contrary; and, most
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importantly, that the theory at present cannot morally distinguish
between permissible punishment of the innocent and permissible
punishment of the guilty.
In rejecting any role for desert, constrained instrumentalism
views rob us of one of the simplest and clearest ways of maintaining
an all-the-way-down, fundamental distinction between the innocent
and the guilty. Whilst I think Tadros’ theory is a brilliant achieve-
ment – a genuinely original contribution to penal philosophy – un-
less it can make this distinction I, for one, will find it difficult to
endorse. I have tried to show that bringing rights (or claims) for-
feiture and infringement to the heart of the theory may be a
promising avenue, although doing so may require endorsing con-
troversial positions on rights – not least the idea that one can
simultaneously hold a right against being punished, and a duty to
submit to punishment.
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